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Abstract 
Investment is an important economic variable and, therefore, it is important to have an understanding of the factors 
that determine its evolution over time. One aspect that has been highlighted in recent research is that corporate 
investment behavior is influenced by the financial structure of firms. In fact, if the hypothesis of imperfect capital 
markets holds, there is no perfect substitutability between the various sources of funds, which may affect the 
investment expenses of firms and lead to a situation of underinvestment. In this paper, a brief overview of different 
explanations for the relationship between financing patterns and investment behavior of firms is presented.  
Keywords: corporate investment; financing patterns; financing constraints; agency costs. 
1. Introduction 
An important aspect in the dynamics of world economies is the behavior of investment. In fact, the study 
of investment is important for several reasons (HASSETT, 2007). Firstly, investment is a source of economic 
growth for it expands the productive capacity of an economy leading to an increase in aggregate supply, 
employment levels and income. Secondly, investment is the more volatile component of aggregate 
demand and therefore is responsible for much of the variation in GDP of a country over the business 
cycle. Thus, knowing how investment may evolve in the future may prove extremely useful in defining 
economic stabilization policies. Thirdly, investment contributes to an increase in productivity, since it leads 
to a rise in the level of capital per worker. This is even more important when a country is near full 
employment, given that in this case, economic growth depends largely on increases in the productivity of 
inputs (especially labor). Simultaneously, additional investment usually means the adoption of new 
technologies or encourages transfers of technology. Finally, it is through capital expenditures that a 
number of economic policy measures affect the economy (e.g. changes in interest rates, the investment 
tax credit or accelerated depreciation allowances). 
When analyzing investment behavior, a relevant question is whether the way it is financed, influences the 
amount of investment. In other words, it is important to understand whether planned investment by 
companies is constrained by available funding. In fact, in perfect capital markets, firms are always able to 
get funds to finance their investment projects, provided they have a positive NPV. By contrast, in 
imperfect capital markets, there is no perfect substitutability between the various forms of financing, 
which may affect the investment expenses of firms and lead to a situation of underinvestment. In this 
second situation, the financial structure of the firm becomes relevant and might have an impact in firms’ 
investment decisions. 
This paper analyses the link between corporate investment and financial structure of a firm, presenting 
possible explanations for the pattern of its corporate financing structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of corporate 
financing patterns. Section 3 and Section 4 discusses in more detail possible, and alternative, explanations 
for these patterns respectively. Section 5 comprises the main conclusions and future research prospects.  
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2. Financing Patterns 
This section presents data on how firms finance their investment expenditure. Figures from Table 1 
suggest that firms tend to rely, to a large extent, on internal funds to finance their investments. 
Table 1: Corporate financing patterns 
 
2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 
SOURCE OF FUNDS             
  Internal Funds 0,51 0,60 0,57 0,49 0,46 0,52 
       Net Income 0,19 0,23 0,24 0,26 0,11 0,17 
       Depreciations 0,32 0,32 0,34 0,21 0,27 0,35 
       Variation of adjustments and provisions 0,00 0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,07 0,00 
  
        External Funds 0,49 0,40 0,43 0,51 0,54 0,48 
       Increases of equity 0,09 0,04 0,00 -0,09 -0,13 -021 
       Decrese in financial investments 0,07 0,11 0,19 0,23 0,27 0,27 
       Decrease in medium/long term debtors 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
       Increases in medium/long term debt to credit institutions 0,14 0,06 0,00 0,10 0,14 0,08 
       Increase in other medium/long term debts 0,02 0,07 0,15 0,16 0,07 0,16 
       Decrease in fixed assets 
             Sale of fixed assets 0,08 0,12 0,09 0,09 0,12 0,16 
       Decrease in working capital 
    
0,08 0,03 
Source: Banco de Portugal - Central Balance-Sheet Database 
The question that arises is why firms adopt this behavior to finance their investments. One possible 
explanation relates to the existence of imperfections in capital markets. In this case, the decision on 
funding sources is relevant, since the cost of using internal or external funds may differ, giving rise to 
situations of financial constraints on companies. It can be said that a company faces financial constraints 
when it cannot obtain all the funding they need, regardless of their cost. In other words, financial 
restrictions refer to the situation in which profitable investment projects, that would be undertaken if 
there were sufficient internal funds, would be abandoned since the availability of external funds for the 
company may be limited, due to information imperfections in capital markets, and to the fact that the cost 
of external funds is greater than that of internal funds (KIM, 1999). 
Thus, firms face a hierarchy of financing sources, which invariably start with the use of the cheapest funds 
(internal funds), then debt financing and, finally, the issue of new shares (or equity capital) (MYERS, 1984). 
The following section presents a more detailed explanation of the meaning of financial constraints.  
3. Financing Constraints 
One possible explanation for companies to face financing constraints is based on the assumption that 
information in capital markets is not perfect. 
In the case of companies’ investment plans, the basic idea is that asymmetric information problems 
between borrowers and lenders may lead to a situation of credit rationing, with the consequent limitation 
of investment expenditure, at least for certain types of companies. In fact, banks do not know with 
absolute certainty what would be the results obtained by companies with the money that they borrow. In 
this context, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that an increase in the interest rate charged to borrowers 
will generally increase the average risk of projects. This is due to two effects. Firstly, borrowers tend to 
move to more risky projects (adverse selection effect). Secondly, because less risky projects become 
relatively less attractive, therefore investors with safer projects are not applying to obtain bank credit 
(moral hazard effect). These two effects may cancel the direct gain that the bank could obtain by charging 
a higher interest rate. For this reason, the bank's profits are actually maximized at a rate at which there is 
an excess of quantity demanded. That is, there is market equilibrium with quantity rationing. 
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This concept of asymmetric information was applied to both debt markets (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
and equity markets (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984, Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984). 
For a better understanding of the financial constraints model, based on Hubbard (1998), Bond and Meghir 
(1994), and Schaller (1993), a graphical analysis is presented that seeks to illustrate the link between the 
amount of capital of a company and its investment decisions. 
Let us assume a company with net worth in the amount of W0. The company faces two investment 
possibilities. The first is to invest the funds W0 in a financial asset with interest rate r. Thus, after one 
period the firm obtains the amount W0(1+r). The second alternative is to invest in fixed capital. It is 
assumed that: (a) the production output occurs in the following period; (b) to produce it is necessary, 
among other things, capital, K; (c) if the project is undertaken, a positive output is expected; (d) in the next 
period two scenarios can happen: good and bad (this means that the quantity actually produced may be 
higher or lower than expected), (e) payments to external investors cannot be greater than the value of the 
output obtained in any of the two scenarios. 
A neutral risk investor will choose the second investment alternative if the return will be greater than the 
return of the first alternative investment. In other words, in this case a company will not continue with an 
investment project if the value of output minus repayments to external investors exceed (1+r)W0. In turn, 
if external investors are risk neutral and operate in a competitive market, they will require a rate of return 
on funds lent to the company of r. 
Consider, now, what happens to the demand for capital when there are perfect capital markets and 
imperfect capital markets. In the case that a company can access a perfect capital market, the supply 
curve of funds, S, in Figure 1, is horizontal and cross the vertical axis for an interest rate r. This means that 
regardless of the source of funds (internal or external to the company), the cost to the company is exactly 
the same. This is the result obtained with the neoclassical investment model (e.g. Tobin-Q model, 1969), in 
which the equilibrium would occur at the intersection of the demand, D (with the typical decreasing 
configuration) and supply, S (with horizontal configuration) curves, i.e. we would have a capital stock K0 
for an interest rate r. 
 











Figure 1: Relationship between a firm’s net worth and the cost of funds, for the case of perfect capital markets 
(adapted from Hubbard, 1998). 
In the case of an imperfect capital market (due to information problems) the supply curve of funds for 
investment is no longer horizontal and it has two segments. The first is a horizontal segment at the 
interest rate r, up to a level of funding W0, corresponding to the net worth of the company. 
Simultaneously, it is assumed that information problems do not affect the investment decisions of 
companies, provided that the amount needed to finance the investment does not exceed the company’s 
net worth. Moreover, as these can serve as collateral, the rate of return required by lenders equals the 
market real interest rate. 
The second segment of the supply curve, S, starts when the level of funds exceed W0 and is upward 
sloped. That is, the shadow cost to the company's external financing exceeds that of internal financing. 
The slope of supply curve, S, reflects information costs incurred by lenders to ensure they lend to 
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companies with good credit record. The higher the marginal cost of information the more inclined the 
ascending portion of the S curve will be. It can be seen, by looking at Figure 2 that, in the presence of 
information costs, the equilibrium capital stock for the company, K1, is less than the equilibrium capital 
stock in the case of perfect capital markets, K0. Therefore, the fundamental result of the financial 
constraints theory is that there is underinvestment in relation to the situation where there are no 




Stock of capital W0 
r 




Figure 2: Relationship between a firm’s net worth and the cost of funds, for the case of imperfect capital markets 
(adapted from Hubbard, 1998). 
Figure 3 shows how the theory of financial constraints proposes to solve the problem of under-
investment by companies in a scenario of imperfect information in capital markets. Again, the equilibrium 
capital stock in perfect markets is K0. However, due to information costs and the amount of net worth of 
the company, W0, the equilibrium capital stock is K1. Assume now that net worth of the company increases 
from W0 to W1, keeping information costs constant. In this case, the supply of funds curve moves from 
S(W0) to S(W1). If the investment opportunities remain constant, the demand curve remains in D. 
Consequently, the increase in net worth, holding constant the cost of information and investment 
opportunities increases the capital stock from K1 to K2. 
 











Figure 3: Effect over the financing costs of an increase in the company’s net worth (adapted from Hubbard, 1998). 
Note that for a company that does not face information costs or has an amount of net worth sufficient to 
finance their desired capital stock, the equilibrium stock of capital remains at K0. That is, for firms facing 
negligible information costs, an increase in equity, regardless of changes in investment opportunities, has 
no effect on investment. For companies facing high investment costs, an increase in net worth leads to 
greater investment, ceterius paribus, while a decrease in net worth leads to less investment. 
The model of financial restrictions has been tested empirically with encouraging results. Some examples 
are: Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988); Palenzuela and Iturriaga (1998); Goergen and Renneboog 
(2001); Carpenter and Petersen (2002); Gelos and Werner (2002) Bo, Lensink and Sterken (2003); Bond, 
Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (2003); Guariglia (2004); Mizen and Vermeulen (2004). 
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4. Alternative Explanations 
Although, the explanation for the financing pattern of Portuguese firms shown and presented in the 
previous sections is robust, other explanations for the financial structure of firms can be found in the 
literature namely, the agency theory, flotation costs, distortions of the tax system, costs of financial 
distress, free cash flow. 
4.1 Agency Theory 
Agency relationships arise in companies that, due to their legal nature, motivates a separation between 
who is the owner (principal) and who in fact manages the company (agent). 
The key point of the agency theory is that although managers of a company act as agents of the owners, 
it is likely that there is no coincidence between their own objectives. This difference of objectives, which 
ultimately arise naturally if it is assumed that both seek to maximize their utility, can lead to what is known 
as agency costs. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) used an agency model in order to obtain a 
theory of the structure of ownership of a company. In developing the model, those authors identified two 
types of agency costs, resulting from conflicts of interest that are generated according to the sources of 
funding that the company uses. 
The first conflict arises as a result of the issue of external equity financing and arises between managers 
and shareholders. If managers have a portion of the company less than one hundred percent, they have 
an incentive to use the resources of the company in order to obtain personal benefits (either monetary or 
non-monetary) or by making over-investments, which increases the size of the company, regardless of its 
profitability. One way to overcome the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders would be 
for the company to be owned and managed solely by the owner-manager. In this case, if more funds were 
needed, the owner-manager could resort to debt issuance. 
However, this leads to the second type of conflict of interest, which is established between shareholders 
and bondholders. The implicit reasoning here is that the owner-manager tends to opt for investment 
projects that provide a high yield but are simultaneously more risky. If successful, the shareholders are left 
with most of the income generated by the project, whereas if they are unsuccessful, creditors would also 
support, the consequences. This stems from the limited liability that is associated with credit agreements. 
To the extent that bondholders anticipate this behavior by shareholders, they require a premium on the 
issuance of debt and/or the inclusion of clauses in the credit agreement that restrict the future behavior 
of management in various ways. These are the agency cost of debt. 
4.2 Flotation/Issuing Costs 
One reason for companies to prefer finance capital expenditure using internal funds is related to the costs 
of issuing new securities (either shares or bonds). These costs are reflected in aspects such as 
underwriting commissions of the issue, registration fees, taxes, and various administrative, accounting and 
legal costs. 
On one hand, the issuance costs vary inversely with the size of the issuance of securities. Specifically, the 
lower the supply of securities the higher the unit costs of issuance. On the other hand, the costs of 
issuance tend to be higher for IPOs than for regular offerings of larger history of use of the capital market 
(BREALEY et al., 2008). 
Thus, it can be concluded that the costs of issuing and trading of new securities may be particularly 
important in creating a hierarchy of financing sources for small and medium enterprises (OLINER and 
RUDEBUSCH, 1992). 
4.3 Tax Advantages  
Another justification for the importance of the company's financial structure, relates to possible 
distortions caused by the tax system, benefiting certain sources of funding in particular. 
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In this context, one can distinguish between two possible situations (POTERBA and SUMMERS, 1983). The 
first one is related to the choice of resorting to equity financing, either internal or external to the 
company. If the rate of personal tax levied on income from capital gains is below the rate of personal tax 
levied on dividends, then individuals prefer to obtain income through capital gains. Thus, the demand for 
shares by investors is addressed mainly to companies that reinvest most profits, as this will tend to 
increase firm value and thus lead to an appreciation of its share price. For the company, this translates 
into an advantage in terms of the cost of equity financing by internal sources over external equity. 
The second distortion caused by the tax system is related to the choice of funding by new external equity 
or debt. To the extent that interest expenses on a loan are accepted as a cost for tax purposes and the 
same does not apply for the cost of equity, there is a bias in favor of debt financing. In fact, the actual cost 
of debt financing becomes lower than equity financing, since the state subsidizes a portion of the costs 
incurred with the debt (debt service). 
In conclusion, if these two distortions caused by the tax system are met in practice, it reinforces the 
possibility of a company facing a hierarchy of financing. In this context, and faced with the need to obtain 
funds, companies follow the following order of preference: internal funds, debt, and issuance of new 
equity. 
4.4 Cost of Financial Distress  
Another justification that has been advanced in the literature to explain the importance of the financial 
situation of a company on their investment behavior is related to the possible negative effects of over-
indebtedness. These are reflected, for example, in situations of financial stress and, ultimately, the 
bankruptcy of the company. 
This explanation appears strongly influenced by the debate generated around the effects that high levels 
of indebtedness of firms might have on economic activity in general. In fact, a high level of debt leads to 
an increased likelihood of defaults on debt by firms. The question that arises is what happens to 
companies that enter a state of financial difficulties. If the company has good economic prospects for the 
future, financial distress has no significant real impact given that the company's debt will be renegotiated 
in order to guarantee the company survival. However, if such renegotiation is difficult, due to conflicting 
rights of creditors, there may be a tendency to liquidate the company, even if it is socially inefficient 
(HOSHI, KASHYAP and SCHARFSTEIN, 1990). 
As the debt of a company increases, ceterius paribus the likelihood of a company facing financial distress 
increases. In this case, the company may incur in direct costs of bankruptcy, such as legal expenses, and 
indirect costs, such as the interruption of operations, loss of suppliers and customers and the imposition 
of restrictions on funding. The present value of these costs must be reflected in the cost of funding. 
Therefore, in order to minimize these costs and avoiding the risk of bankruptcy, firms may choose to 
finance, preferably, with internal funds. 
4.5 Free Cash Flow  
Jensen (1986) proposed a different explanation for the impact of debt over companies. For this author, a 
high level of debt forces firms to become more efficient, avoiding waste of resources and contributing to 
improved economic performance. 
In fact, if managers distribute most of the income generated by a company to shareholders, few resources 
are left on which to exercise a discretionary management. Thus, managers see their power reduced. 
Furthermore, this reduction in power is even more pronounced when they need new financing, because 
managers become more subject to monitoring activities by external investors, which may involve an 
increase in the cost of external funds. 
In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that managers may be tempted to finance investment projects 
based on retained earnings and not distribute them to shareholders. This allows managers a greater 
control and flexibility over the company’s resources. One consequence of this type of behavior is a 
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possible decrease in the efficiency of the company, which may arise from investments in projects with 
negative NPV but that lead to the growth of the company. 
While competition in product and input markets can be a disciplining force for companies seeking greater 
efficiency, since that competition tends to drive prices towards the minimum average cost, Jensen (1986) 
considers that these disciplining forces are often weaker in new activities and activities that involve 
substantial economic rents. In these cases, monitoring by the internal control system of the company and 
by the corporate control market may be more important. 
Thus, the fundamental problem is how to motivate managers to return money to shareholders rather than 
invest below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies. In this sense, Jensen (1986) 
draws attention to the role that debt issuance may have as a factor motivating the company's efficiency. 
That is, in spite of the disadvantages that borrowing may represent, it also brings some benefits, including 
the motivation of managers and their companies in becoming more efficient. 
The explanation for the control power of debt on managers is as follows. The debt issue permits, 
effectively, managers fulfill their promise not to withhold future cash flows, since they are required to pay 
interest and repayment of borrowed capital. Thus, in practice debt is in fact a substitute for dividends. By 
issuing debt rather than equity shares, managers are complying with their promise to pay future cash 
flows in a way that cannot be achieved by simple increases in dividends. Thus, a higher level of debt 
reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing cash flow available that can be spent on a 
discretionary basis by the managers. 
Jensen (1986), therefore, concludes that these debt control effects are a potential determinant of the 
capital structure of firms. Two recent studies support this hypothesis. Brio, Miguel and Pindado (2003) 
developed a model to assess the relationship between investment and firm value and tested, explicitly, 
the free cash flow hypothesis. Using an unbalanced panel comprising 133 Spanish quoted companies, 
they concluded that “high free cash flow firms sustain a decrease in value when they invest, whereas low 
free cash flow firms that invest experience an increase in value”. Also Chung, Firth and Kim (2005), using 
22,576 company year observations over the period 1984–1996 for US companies, confirm that low-growth 
companies with high free cash flow tend to use “income-increasing discretionary accruals to offset the low 
or negative earnings that result from inevitably accompany investments with negative net present values”, 
therefore corroborating the free cash flow hypothesis.  
5. Conclusion 
Corporate investment is essential for the growth of any economy. Therefore, it is of paramount 
importance to have an understanding of its main determinants. One aspect that has been highlighted in 
the last two decades is the impact of the financial structure of a firm on its investment expenses. Particular 
attention has been given to the hypothesis that firms face financial restrictions.  
It is said that companies face financial restrictions when they cannot get all the funding they need, 
regardless of their opportunity cost. This means that companies reveal a hierarchy of preferences in the 
choice of sources for financing their investment plans because the costs differ as to their origins. Thus, 
companies begin to use the funds that have lower cost, which correspond to internal funds, then resort to 
borrowing, and ultimately to the use of funds with higher costs - new equity increases. 
In terms of investment decisions, it might happen that companies see themselves unable to rely on 
external funds to finance their investment plans due to information problems in financial markets, leading 
to a situation of underinvestment. Hence, it is likely that the financial structure of a firm has an impact on 
its investment decisions. 
Other alternative explanations exist in the literature that were analyzed in this paper namely the agency 
theory, flotation costs, distortions of the tax system, the impact of financial distress and the role of free 
cash flow.  
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The next step in this area of research is to empirically test, for a sample of Portuguese firms, the impact of 
these alternative explanations on corporate investment. The idea is to identify the relative importance that 
each factor has on investment expenses of firms. In other words, the aim is to find out which are the 
possible driving determinants in a firms’ investment-financial structure relationship. 
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